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The decision-making procedures used in the UN Security Council – chiefly the veto granted to its five
permanent members – have frequently been criticised on the basis that they prevent agreements
being reached on key issues. This criticism has been particularly acute with respect to the failure of
the Security Council to agree joint positions on the ongoing crises in Syria and Ukraine. Thomas G.
Weiss argues that while such arguments have been made for decades, there remain no easy
answers. Nevertheless, despite the recent criticism, the Security Council is likely to remain as
relevant to international peace and security as it ever was.
The ongoing weeping and gnashing of European and other teeth over Ukraine reflects the most
serious East-West confrontation since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The inability of the United Nations to agree on
concerted action in the face of the downing of the Malaysian Airlines flight in July by Russian-backed rebels – like
earlier paralysis before Russia’s February invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea – brings sharply back into
relief an issue that was front-and-centre for the first 45 years of the world organisation’s history.
Tempered somewhat after the end of the Cold War, the
shape and functioning of the UN Security Council now
figure prominently in headlines. In particular, a single
state can prevent robust action to counter, or even
condemn, aberrant behaviour that contravenes
international law. Along with international inaction to halt
Syria’s abattoir, it is logical to point a finger at the
Security Council and declare that it is unfit for purpose.
Of course, but so what else is new? Notwithstanding the
dyspepsia from dour diplomats, the Security Council will
remain as central, or peripheral, to international peace
and security as in the past. Is it not possible, shrieks the
usual chorus of observers, to increase the membership
and eliminate the veto in the Security Council enjoyed
by the five permanent members? If not, are there clever
ways around it? The answer to both questions is “no.”
The pipe dream of Security Council reform
No question has uselessly spilled more ink or printer toner than reforming the Security Council. The 1965 UN
Charter amendment that increased the numbers of elected members from 6 to 10 is one of the few (along with
increased membership in the Economic and Social Council) such changes, which reflected the influx of new
member states following decolonisation. The demand for further changes – increasing the numbers of elected and
permanent members as well as eliminating or expanding the veto – has been a permanent feature of UN debate
ever since. Unfortunately, everyone agrees that the Security Council reflects the world of 1945 and not the twenty-
first -century’s distribution of power, but no one has a solution that satisfies the various churlish factions.
Proposals for additional members include numbers ranging from 19 to 26 (rather than the current 15), with variations
of increased numbers of two-year elected members, the addition of new four-year renewable members, and the
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creation of 4 to 6 additional permanent members, with and without veto. The most frequently mentioned possible
candidates as permanent members – the so-called Gang of Four consisting of Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil –
are resisted by at least some of the permanent members, and regional rivals are actively hostile or passively
aggressive about certain candidates.
Concerning the veto, some proposals favour no new vetoes for permanent members while others insist upon them –
no second-class citizens for Africa, the argument goes, even new permanent ones. Other proposals favour
eliminating the veto or agreeing not to use it in humanitarian catastrophes, but the P5 must agree to voluntarily give
up such power. Those wishing to bet on that likelihood are hard to find with odds below zero.
The cacophony, jealousies, and vested interests that have plagued this issue since 1965 remain. Will the inability to
move ahead with dramatic reforms compromise UN credibility? Not more than in the past. One should recall that
despite the international inability to halt mass murder in Syria, the Security Council was still relevant. When the
politics were right and the need arose for a face-saving way to dispose of Bashir al-Assad’s chemical weapons, the
universal UN was still called upon to authorise and work with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons.
Permanent Security Council membership and the veto in particular seem like anachronistic relics; but these traces of
a bygone era are here to stay because every proposed change raises as many problems as it solves. If it was not
clear earlier, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine as earlier ones in Crimea and Syria demonstrate why Russia will not
agree to set aside the veto just as ongoing troubles in the Middle East indicate unequivocally why the US Senate
will not agree to any such change.
It is redolent not only of the Cold War but also of the paralysis in the UN Security Council during that period because
of actual or threatened vetoes by permanent members. Alas, there were no procedural gimmicks or structural
constitutional changes then, nor are there any today. The death knell for Security Council reform, but not the
Security Council, has tolled.
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